and infection control measures in public hospitals were tightened to limit nosocomial 33 transmission within healthcare facilities. However, the recommendations on the 34 transmission-based precautions required for COVID-19 in hospital settings vary from 35 droplet and contact precautions, to contact and airborne precautions with placement of 36 patients in airborne infection isolation rooms. 37
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Introduction 54
Coronavirus disease 2019 , caused by the severe acute respiratory 55 syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2), started in Wuhan since December 2019 but 56 has now spread throughout different provinces in China, and has since been declared a 57
Public Health Emergency of International Concern by the World Health Organization 58 (WHO) on 30 th January, 2020 [1] [2] [3] . Hong Kong, in close vicinity with China and 59 ruthlessly affected by the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) 17 years ago, 60 has started preparation for COVID-19 since 31 st December, 2019, when an alert of 61 clustered pneumonia of unknown origin was announced by the Wuhan Municipal 62
Health Commission [4] . The first imported case of COVID-19 in Hong Kong was 63 reported on 23 rd January, 2020, and the first local case (with no known travel history 64 or travel-related contact history) was reported on 31 st January, 2020. The WHO 65 currently recommended droplet and contact precautions for patients with suspected or 66 known COVID-19, while applying airborne precautions when performing aerosol 67 generating procedures (AGPs) [5] . While the Australian Government has adopted the 68 WHO recommendations [6] , the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, the 69
Public Health England and the Hong Kong Hospital Authority (HA), the statutory 70 body responsible for managing Hong Kong's public hospital service, recommended 71 contact and airborne precautions for patients with suspected or known 72 including placement to airborne infection isolation room (AIIR) [7] [8] [9] . The potential 73 risk of nosocomial transmission of SARS-CoV-2 has posted great stress and anxiety 74 among healthcare workers, a shadow casted by the SARS epidemic in 2003 [10, 11] . 75
For COVID-19, current reports from China revealed an attack rate of 2.09-29% 76 among healthcare workers [3, [12] [13] Although the major routes of transmission of 77 SARS-CoV-2 is believed to be droplet and contact, some healthcare workers 78 remained extremely mindful of the potential 'super-spreading events' due to 79 opportunistic airborne transmission through various healthcare-related activities 80 [11, 14] . While opening suction of respiratory tract, intubation, bronchoscopy, and 81 cardiopulmonary resuscitation were well accepted as AGPs [5] , the extent of 82 infectious aerosols generated by the use of nebulizers, high-flow oxygen (especially 83 through venturi-type masks) and non-invasive positive pressure ventilations were 84 more controversial [15, 16] . These activities were avoided during the SARS epidemic 85 in view of the potential risks [15] , but a subsequent systematic review found no 86 statistically significant increase in SARS transmission risk with therapeutic activities 87 such as suction before or after intubation, nebulizer treatment, oxygen mask 88 manipulation or chest compression [16] . Here, we report the outbreak investigation 89 and outcome of 49 patients and 71 healthcare workers exposed to a patient with 90 severe pneumonia due to SARS-CoV-2 in a general ward setting before the diagnosis 91 was made. 
Contact tracing and outbreak management 110
Immediate infection control measures were implemented, and contact tracing was 111 conducted to search for all staff and patients exposed to the index patient before the 112 diagnosis of COVID-19 was made. A contact case was defined as a patient or staff 113 who stayed or worked in the same ward as the index patient. Patients would be 114 identified through the Patient Administration Contact Tracing System from the index 115 patient admission until the diagnosis of COVID-19 was made, while staff contacts 116 were identified through ward managers. These contacts were interviewed and risk 7 categorized according to the nature of activities, duration of exposure, personal 118 protective equipment (PPE) worn at the time of exposure. 'Staff close contact' was 119 defined as staff who had contact within two metres of the index case for a cumulative 120 time of >15 minutes, or had performed AGPs, without 'appropriate' PPE. 121 'Appropriate' PPE in the above contact episodes referred to the use of N95 respirator, 122 face shield/goggle, gown and gloves. Patients who shared the same cubicle with the 123 index case were considered as 'patient close contact'. Staff close contacts were 124 subjected to a 14-day work exclusion and quarantine at a designated camp site, 125 followed by medical surveillance for another 14 days. Patient close contacts were 126 quarantined into an AIIR (or quarantine camp if patient was deemed clinically stable 127 to be discharged from hospital) for 14 days, followed by medical surveillance for 14 128 days. Other staff and patient contacts ('casual contacts') were subjected to medical 129 surveillance for 28 days with no restriction to work or discharge from hospital. Body 130 temperature and respiratory symptoms were monitored daily throughout the 28-day 131 period. Any abnormalities will be reported to the medical personnel at the quarantine 132 camp, or to the hospital infection control team, with hospitalization into an AIIR and 133 testing of SARS-CoV-2 where indicated. 134 135
Real-time reverse transcription polymerase chain reaction assay for SARS-CoV-136 2 137
Upper respiratory tract specimens, e.g. nasopharyngeal aspirates (NPA), 138 nasopharyngeal swabs (NPS) with or without concurrent throat swabs, or lower 139 respiratory tract specimens, e.g. sputum, tracheal aspirate or bronchoalveolar lavage, 140
were all acceptable specimen types for the real-time reverse transcription-polymerase 141 chain reaction assay (RT-PCR). All specimens were preserved in viral transport 8 medium before further processing. Total nucleic acid extraction was performed using 143
MagNA Pure LC 2.0 (Roche, Switzerland)(from 3 rd -5 th February 2020) or MagNA 144
Pure 96 (Roche, Switzerland)(from 6 th February 2020), and the RT-PCR was 145 Result 159
Outbreak investigation 160
The index patient, a 64-year-old woman, attended the Department of Accident and 161
Emergency at 2342 on 1 st February, 2020 with fever, productive cough and 162 breathlessness for two days. She developed flu-like symptoms on 24 th January, 2020 163 with transient improvement after taking antibiotics and symptomatic treatment 164 prescribed by a general practitioner. However, her fever relapsed on 30 th January, 165 2020 with productive cough and dyspnea. She had no history of travel in the 166 preceding month, but she owned a fashion boutique with many mainland Chinese 167 customers owing to its proximity to the West Kowloon high-speed rail station. On 168 admission, she had a fever of 39.6°C with sinus tachycardia of 126 bpm and blood 169 pressure of 198/92 mmHg. She was tachypnoeic with oxygen saturation of 80% in 170 room air. Bilateral crepitations were heard on auscultation and chest X-ray revealed 171 multi-lobar pulmonary infiltrates (Figure 2a ). In the absence of history of travel to 172
China or contact with a confirmed COVID-19 patient, she was admitted to ward A in 173 an open cubicle under standard precautions for community-acquired pneumonia (6 174 ACH, normal pressure setting) at 0122 on 2 nd February, 2020. She could not wear a 175 surgical mask as she was on oxygen therapy through a simple facemask (Soundway®, 176 Ningbo Shengyurui Medical Appliances Co. Ltd, Ningbo, China, Figure 2b ). She also 177 had frequent coughs while residing in the ward. She became more hypoxic around 178 1800 and required an increase of oxygen therapy to 8 L/minute, delivered through the 179 same facemask. On 3 rd February, 2020, she was transferred to an AIIR at 1235 and 180 was electively intubated at 1300 for progressive respiratory failure. Nasopharyngeal 181 swab for multiplex PCR FilmArray® RP2 panel (Biofire Diagnostics, bioMérieux, 10 (Abbott, Illinois, United States) were negative. The patient was tested for COVID-19 184 as enhanced laboratory surveillance on 3 rd February, 2020, where both combined NPA 185 with throat swab, and tracheal aspirate showed detectable SARS-CoV-2 RNA, with a 186
Ct value of 22.8 and 26.1, respectively. The patient was subsequently transferred to 187 the Infectious Diseases Center, Princess Margaret Hospital, for further management. 188 189
Contact tracing and outbreak management 190
Terminal disinfection and changing of all curtains were performed in ward A 191 immediately after the diagnosis of COVID-19 in the index patient, followed by 192 regular environmental disinfection twice daily with 1 000 ppm sodium hypochlorite. 
attachments. 199
A total of 71 staff and 49 patients were identified from contact tracing. Seven staff 200 and ten patients fulfilled the criteria of 'close contact' (Table I) . All staff and patients 201 who did not fulfill the pre-defined criteria for close contacts were managed as 'casual 202 contacts'(appendices table A.1, table A.2). Thirty staff and 22 patients developed 203 fever and/or reported respiratory symptoms during the surveillance period, with 76 204 respiratory specimens sent for RT-PCR for SARS-CoV-2. All specimens from the 52 205 contacts were negative for SARS-CoV-2, including all patient close contacts and six 206 of the seven staff close contacts (Table I) . Four patients (casual contacts) died from 207 condition unrelated to COVID-19 during the surveillance period. The remaining 208
Discussion 210
More than 100 000 cases of COVID-19 have been reported worldwide at the time of 211 writing, after just over two months from the identification of this novel coronavirus 212 [17, 18] . While it is believed that person-to-person spread of SARS-CoV-2 occurs 213 predominantly through droplet and contact transmissions, the actual dynamics 214 remained uncertain. The reproduction number of SARS-CoV-2 appears to be higher 215 than SARS, with an initial estimation of 1.4-6.49, and median of 2.79 [19] [20] [21] . The 216 high attack rates among household contacts [22] [23] [24] , and passengers on the Diamond 217 Princess Cruise are most concerning [25]. In the described scenario, our patient had 218 much coughs and high viral load (as implicated by the low Ct-value) detected from 219 her respiratory specimens, moreover she could not put on surgical mask during her 220 stay in the general medical ward. All these factors could have contributed to much 221 droplet generation from our index patient, with secondary contamination of her 222 surroundings. Moreover, she received oxygen therapy at 8 L/min through a simple 223 oxygen facemask for a significant amount of time. Oxygen therapy with flow of ≥ 224 6L/minute has been considered an AGP in the HA hospitals. Despite the 225 aforementioned, none of the neighboring patients or staff contacts were infected. 226
While there is no consensus on what constitute 'close' and 'casual' contacts, our risk 227 assessment approach was similar to the subsequent published guidance for contact 228 tracing [6, [26] [27] [28] [29] (Table II) . We believe that the universal mask wearing of staff, 229 patients and visitors as a component of the Emergency Response in HA hospitals, as 230 well as the heightened alertness to hand hygiene and environmental cleanliness have 231 played a major part in halting further transmissions in this incident. In fact, frequent 232 hand hygiene and appropriate use of surgical masks have previously been shown to be 233 a protective factor against SARS, and influenza [30] [31] [32] [33] . In the Shenzhen family 234 cluster of COVID-19, the un-infected family member was the only person reported to 235 have consistent use of surgical masks [22] . Also, the lack of secondary transmission in 236 our experience may imply that oxygen therapy ≥ 6 L/min with simple facemask posts 237 a low risk of aerosol generation, consistent with the finding from a previous study 238 [34] . Another local study on aerosol dispersion in various respiratory therapies 239 demonstrated that the air leak through the side vents of the simple oxygen facemask 240 during delivery of oxygen for 6, 8, 10 L/min were limited to 0.22, 0.3 and 0.4 m [35] , 241
hence the neighboring patients who should be at least 1 metre from the index patient 242
were not at increased risk of droplet transmission despite the use of high-flow oxygen. 243
There are a few limitations in our study. Firstly, our sample size was small with only 244 one index patient. However, the detailed description of contact tracing including 245 nature of exposure and PPE worn involving 120 contacts may still be useful 246 observation of transmission dynamics in a normal ward environment, since majority 247 of the subsequent patients were admitted directly into AIIR. Secondly, we only tested 248 contacts with fever or respiratory symptoms with RT-PCR, hence the possibility of 249 asymptomatic infection among the staff close contacts cannot be entirely excluded. 250
Nonetheless, all ten close patient contacts, who had stayed in the same cubicle for >20 251 hours as the index patients had multiple negative SARS-CoV-2 RT-PCR performed 252 up to day 13 and 14 from the last exposure. Thirdly, quantitative RT-PCR and viral 253 culture were not available at our center, thus the exact viral load and the viability of 254 the virus cannot be ascertained. 255
Conclusion 256
The route of transmission of SARS-CoV-2 is to be confirmed, however there is no 257 reason to suspect its physical property would differ greatly from SARS, MERS or 258 other coronavirus. Our index patient with COVID-19, despite a 35 hours' stay in an 259 open cubicle in a general ward, did not result in any secondary nosocomial infection 260 in any contacts at the time of writing (37 days after last exposure to the index case). 2009 -2011 . BMC Infect Dis. 2012 12:26. doi: 10.1186 /1471 -2334 Yes (1, 4, 8, 11, 13 1, 6, 9, 13) .
Patient
Yes (35) 07 Yes.
-Yes (2, 4, 9, 11, 14) .
Yes ( Yes (1, 2, 5, 7, 11, 13 Yes (14).
'-' not available due to inability of patient to provide information on compliance of 423 surgical mask wearing; #Last exposure date, i.e. Feb 3, 2020, was counted as day 0. 424 AIIR: Airborne Infection Isolation Room. 425 Yes (14).
'-' not available due to inability of patient to provide information on compliance of 2 surgical mask wearing; #Last exposure date, i.e. Feb 3, 2020, was counted as day 0. 3 AIIR: Airborne Infection Isolation Room. 4 intubation, bronchoscopy, cardiopulmonary resuscitation); PPE: personal protective equipment. 8
